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Causal explaining and causal predicating proceed in social science have 
characters of multiformity and fallibility, which make the metaphysic of causality 
running into a new trouble。In the resent twenty years，the mechanism causal theory 
and the manipulability theory advanced respectively the researches about the problem 
of causal inference. However, these two theories come into opposition on the 
metaphysic problem of causality. The assertions of the manipulability theory can 
locate the causation accurately and operationalize it in form. But, on the one hand, it 
need to add many infeasible assumptions in practice to ensure the status of the 
monism of experiment for the manipulability theory; on the other hand, it has to face a 
problem of how to converge variety of methods existing in social science to the 
method of experiment operating. And the mechanism theory can make up for the 
deficiencies of the manipulability theory above critically. But with the deficiency of 
informalizing, the assertions of the mechanism theory become infeasible in practice, 
and it is difficult for the mechanism theory to form a coherent causal theory with the 
manipulability theory in social science. 
The theories of evidence provide a new perspective for forming a coherent causal 
theory in social science, which expand the perspective of the discussions about 
causation problem to the view of causal evidence or causal knowledge and the 
application of scientific evidence in practice. However, in the areas of the causal 
theoretical knowledge and of application practice of evidence, the researches of the 
theories of evidence are not yet mature, that is, the views opened by the theories of 
evidence can continue to go deep in the two aspects that may be called internal aspect 
and external aspect. In the internal aspect, the probabilistic causality theories overturn 
the traditional views of causation, which could be conductive to promote the 
researches about the problem of causality. And in the external aspect, it is conductive 
for clarifying the nature of causation to investigate the causal modeling practice in 
social science. 
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托内克（Robert Stalnaker）在《条件句理论》（A Theory of Conditionals，
1968）一文中对反事实条件句进行了严谨的研究；麦基（John Mackie）在《宇
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